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Arbitration Awards in Federal Sector Public 
Employment: The Compelling Need Standard of 
Appellate Review 
Executive Order 11,491,' the current touchstone for labor- 
management relations in federal sector public ernpl~yrnent,~ al-
lows federal government agencies and unions representing federal 
employees to include provisions for binding arbitration as an 
employee grievance3 resolution technique in their collective bar- 
gaining  agreement^.^ Binding third party arbitration and other 
"bargained-for" techniques are referred to as "negotiated griev- 
ance  procedure^."^ Disputants in an arbitration proceeding may 
1. 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-1970 Compilation). Exec. Order 11,491 has been amended by 
Exec. Order No. 11,616,3 C.F.R. 605 (1971-1975 Compilation), Exec. Order No. 11,636, 3 
C.F.R. 634 (1971-1975 Compilation), Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1971-1975 
Compilation), and Exec. Order No. 11,901, 41 Fed. Reg. 4807 (1976). 
2. For a general background of labor-management relations in the federal service, see 
Seidenberg, Federal Sector Overview: Collective Bargaining-An Address Before the 1975 
Seminar on "Employee Relations in the Federal Government, " 34 FED. B.J. 229 (1975). 
3. The term "grievance arbitration" refers to resolution of disputes regarding the 
interpretation of the already negotiated collective bargaining agreement and should be 
distinguished from the "interest arbitration" that denotes that resolution of disputes 
during the negotiation of a new agreement. In federal sector labor-management relations, 
interest arbitration is generally provided by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service. When this mediation is not successful, the Executive Order authorizes the Fed- 
eral Services Impasse Panel to consider the negotiation impasse. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 
6 17, 3 C.F.R. 861, 871 (1966-1970 Compilation) (as amended). For a discussion of the 
functions of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the Federal Service 
Impasse Panel, see Seidenberg, supra note 2, a t  232-33. 
4. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 4 13(a)-(b), 3 C.F.R. 861,870 (1966-1970 Compilation) (as 
amended). 
5. Certain grievances may not be covered by negotiated grievance procedures but 
must be resolved through the statutory appeals procedure of the Civil Service Commis- 
sion. Grievances subject to the statutory appeals include equal opportunity complaints 
and grievances pertaining to promotions, adverse personnel actions, changes in the status 
of employees, and methods for making personnel appointments. See R. SMITH, H .  ED- 
WARDS, & R. CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 878,882-83 (1974) (quot- 
ing Pickets at City Hall: Report and Recommendations of the Twentieth Century Task 
Fund Force on Labor Disputes in Public Employment); Ullman & Begin, The Structure 
and Scope of Appeals Procedures for Public Employees, 23 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 323 
(1970). In actual practice, there may be some overlap between the types of grievances 
covered by the negotiated grievance procedures and the statutory appeals rules. See id. 
at 325,333. It has been urged that this overlap is undesirable because it leads to confusion 
and failure of employees to assert all of their rights and because it may produce conflicting 
interpretations and unequal treatment of cases that should be treated similarly. Id. 
Where the parties disagree as to whether a particular grievance should be resolved 
through the negotiated grievance procedure or the statutory appeals procedure, the parties 
can mutually agree to submit the question to a neutral arbitrator. The decision of the 
arbitrator can be appealed by either of the parties to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Labor-Management Relations. This procedure was established by Exec. Order No. 11,838, 
430 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1977: 
appeal from the arbitrator's award to the Federal Labor Relations 
Council," quasi-judicial panel authorized to review arbitration 
awards that allegedly violate "applicable law, appropriate regula- 
tion," or Executive Order 11,491.' In examining awards chal- 
lenged as violative of federal agency regulations, the Council's 
practice has been to determine whether a conflict exists between 
the challenged arbitral award and the agency regulations, but the 
Council has not evaluated the underlying necessity for the exis- 
tence of the regulations in the first place.8 
This comment will analyze when and to what extent an arbi- 
trator's award should be set aside when a party appeals to the 
Council on the ground that the decision conflicts with an agency 
policy or regulation. The intent of this comment is to outline the 
need for a standard by which the propriety of those policies and 
regulations can be tested and to suggest a workable and reliable 
standard which the Federal Labor Relations Council can employ 
to meet that need. 
Federal agencies are required by Executive Order 11,491 to 
bargain collectively with federal employee unions to develop ne- 
goitated grievance  procedure^.^ A brief historical review of the 
Executive orders dealing with negotiated grievance procedures in 
the federal sector reveals an increasing acceptance by the federal 
government of binding arbitration as the final procedural step.1° 
3 C.F.R. 957 (1971-1975 Compilation). See Kagel, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal 
Service: How Final and Binding, 51 ORE. L. REV. 134, 141-43 (1971). 
An interesting question was raised by City School Dist. v. Poughkeepsie, 35 N.Y.2d 
599,324 N.E.2d 144,364 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1974), where the court held that an employee was 
allowed to proceed to arbitration even after losing his statutory claim. 
6. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 13(b), 3 C.F.R. 861, 870 (1966-1970 Compilation) (as 
amended). 
7. 5 C.F.R. O 2411.32 (1977). Parties may also challenge an arbitrator's decision "on 
other grounds similar to those upon which challenges to arbitration awards are sustained 
by courts in private sector labor-management relations." Id. 
8. See, e.g., Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v. FAA, 5 F.L.R.C. No. 
76A-10 (Jan. 18, 1977) (Rep. No. 121); Francis E. Warren Air Force Base v. American 
Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2354,4 F.L.R.C. No. 75A-127 (Sept. 30, 1976) (Rep. No. 
114); Wing Commander, 29th Flying Training Wing, Craig Air Force Base v. American 
Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local Union No. 2574,4 F.R.L.C. No. 75A-121 (Sept. 14,1976) 
(Rep. No. 112). 
9. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 13(a), 3 C.F.R. 861, 870 (1966-1970 Compilation) (as 
amended). 
10. Under Exec. Order 10,988, the original order dealing with federal labor manage- 
ment relations, arbitral awards were merely advisory-always subject to approval by the 
federal agency that was involved. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 9 8(b), 3 C.F.R. 521,525 (1959- 
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Executive Order 11,491, however, indirectly imposes sub- 
stantive limitations on the scope of an arbitrator's discretion in 
fashioning remedies in grievance disputes. Section 13 of the order 
covers grievance and arbitration procedures and directs the par- 
ties to negotiate their own grievance resolution techniques. This 
section, however, mentions no express limitations on the arbitra- 
tor's authority; it merely prohibits the grievance procedures from 
conflicting with other portions of the order. The limitations are 
found elsewhere in the order" and are incorporated into section 
13 by reference.12 
The prominent limitations on the scope of arbitration derive 
from sections ll(b) and 12(b) of the order. Section l l (b)  extends 
to the federal agencies certain "discretionary management 
rights." By virtue of this section, agency officials have the discre- 
tion to refuse to negotiate with the employee unions during collec- 
tive bargaining with respect to any of the following matters: 
"[?]he mission of an agency; its budget; its organization; the 
number of employees; and the numbers, types, and grades of 
positions or employees assigned to an organizational unit, work 
project or tour of duty; the technology of performing its work; or 
its internal security practices."13 These discretionary manage- 
ment rights represent an exception to the general mandate for the 
agencies to negotiate with unions. 
Section 12(b) enunciates six management rights that cannot 
- -- - 
1963 Compilation); see Kagel, supra note 5, at 135-36. 
Although binding arbitration was prohibited, advisory arbitration was widely em- 
ployed under Exec. Order 10,988. According to one survey, nearly 75% of the negotiated 
collective bargaining agreements provided for advisory arbitration of grievances. See Com- 
ment, Legality and Propriety of Agreements to Arbitrate Major and Minor Disputes in 
Public Employment, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 134 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Legality 
and Propriety of Arbitration]. 
Exec. Order 11,491 as amended now permits parties to provide for binding arbitra- 
tion. Moreover, the history of Presidential task force recommendations leading up to the 
present order demonstrates that binding arbitration is not only allowed but encouraged. 
See U.S. FEDERAL LABOR ELATIONS COUNCIL, ABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FED- 
ERAL SERVICE 42-44 (1975) (reporting the Council's January 1975 recommendations for 
amending Exec. Order 11,491); id. at 73-74 (reporting a Presidential study committee's 
August 1969 recommendations on Exec. Order 10,988). 
As of September 1975, 28 states permitted grievance mechanisms culminating in 
arbitration for public service employees. See Note, Public Sector Grievance Procedures, 
Due Process, and the Duty of Fair Representation, 89 HAW. L. REV. 752, 753 n.11 (1976). 
11. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,491, §§ ll(b), 12(b), 3 C.F.R. 861,868-69 (1966-1970 
Compilation) (as amended); Tobias, The Scope of Bargaining in the Federal Sector: 
Collective Bargaining or Collective Consultation, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 555 (1976). 
12. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 13(a), 3 C.F.R. 861, 870 (1966-1970 Compilation) (as 
amended). 
13. Id. § ll(b), 3 C.F.R. at 868-69. 
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be subject to collective bargaining, even a t  an agency's discretion. 
Specifically, these "mandatory management rights" include the 
right to do the following: 
(1) to direct employees of the agency; (2) to hire, promote, 
transfer, assign, and retain employees in positions within the 
agency, and to suspend, demote, discharge, or take other disci- 
plinary action against employees; (3) to  relieve employees 
from duties because of lack of work or for other legitimate rea- 
sons; (4) to maintain the efficiency of the Government opera- 
tions entrusted to them; (5) to determine the methods, means, 
and personnel by which such operations are to be conducted; 
and (6) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out 
the mission of the agency in situations of emergency . . . . 14 
The mandatory management rights language of section 12(b) is 
designed to control the bargaining parties. First, the language 
tends to reduce the number of demands made by the union and 
thus prevents the union from meddling with management prerog- 
atives. Additionally, it prevents unwitting or overly conciliatory 
management officials from yielding rights that might infringe on 
the power of a subsequent official of the same agency. 
The protected management rights provisions15 in sections 
l l ( b )  and 12(b) not only place limits on negotiations in collective 
bargaining, but also effectively circumscribe the actions and au- 
thority of the arbitrator. The logical extension of limiting the 
bargaining parties is to restrict the arbitrator. For if the parties 
are prohibited from interfering with these management rights, 
then the parties cannot empower an arbitrator to do their med- 
dling for them? These limitations on the arbitrator are also dic- 
tated by the langage in section 13 that prohibits grievance proce- 
dures from conflicting with other portions of the order. Thus, the 
scope of arbitration is limited by the management rights sections 
and can be no more extensive than the scope of collective bargain- 
ing. l7 
Although the mandatory and discretionary management 
rights are enumerated in the order, the full scope of these rights 
14. Id. $ 12(b), 3 C.F.R. a t  869-70. 
15. At least 20 states have adopted management rights limitations in public employ- 
ment collective bargaining. Seidenberg, supra note 2, at 239. See Wellington & Winter, 
Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805,865-66 (1970). 
16. See Grodin, Political Aspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 64 CALIF. L. 
REV. 678, 697 (1976); Kagel, supra note 5, at 137-38. 
17. The pattern of private sector experience indicates that attempts to limit the scope 
of collective bargaining will likely prove unproductive. See Grodin, supra note 16, at 696. 
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is not articulated in the broad, general language of the Executive 
Order. Rather, the scope is more fully expressed in the myriad 
policies and regulations issued by the executive branch and its 
various federal agencies to govern agency operations? The poli- 
cies and regulations related to these broadly stated management 
rights are so numerous and comprehensive that some commenta- 
tors have suggested that few matters can be subject to negotiation 
or arbitration.lg 
Such a broad reading, however, would be contrary to a widely 
respected policy in public and private sector labor-management 
relations-the policy of encouraging the use of collective bargain- 
ing, including third party grievance a r b i t r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Generally, the 
presence of binding arbitration as the final dispute resolution 
technique promotes more serious collective bargaining.21 Arbitra- 
tion is a more rational22 and democratic23 method for resolving 
disputes than retaliatory tactics that rely on economic muscle.24 
Evidence of the wide respect for binding arbitration can be found 
in the fact that 95 percent of all recently negotiated private sector 
labor-management agreements provide for binding arbitration of 
grievance disputes.25 Thus, when an arbitrator's award in a fed- 
18. Decisions of the Federal Labor Relations Council also play a significant role in 
defining the scope of the management rights. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees 
Union Chapter No. 010 v. IRS, 4 F.L.R.C. No. 74A-93 (Feb. 24, 1976) (Rep. No. 98) 
(construing § l l (b)  of the order). 
19. See Tobias, supra note 11, a t  566-70; Kagel, supra note 5, at 143. But see Aronin, 
Collective Bargaining in the Federal Service: A Balanced Approach, 44 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 576, 601 (1976). 
20. Congress has established a national policy of encouraging collective bargaining 
in the private sector. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). The history of the Executive orders demon- 
strates a desire to encourage collective bargaining in the federal sector of public employ- 
ment. See notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra. 
21. See McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Term: A New Approach to the 
Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 1209-13 (1972); 
Legality and Propriety of Arbitration, supra note 10, a t  136. 
22. See R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR ELATIONS TAW-CASES 
AND MATERIALS 761, 764 (5th ed. 1974); Grodin, supra note 16, a t  679. 
23. See McAvoy, supra note 21, a t  1209; Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in 
Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1002 (1955). 
Arbitration provides experience in conflict resolution through representatives. It pro- 
vides a forum in which the dispute can receive a full and fair hearing. See United Steel- 
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Legality and Propriety of 
Arbitration, supra note 10, at 136. 
24. It  is also generally assumed that arbitration deters strikes. See McAvoy, supra 
note 21, a t  1210-11. But see Grodin, supra note 16, a t  701 (ability of arbitration to deter 
strikes over long periods of time still undetermined). 
25. Cohen & Eaby, The Gardner-Denver Decision and Labor Arbitration, 27 LAB. L.J. 
18 (1976); see Legality and Propriety of Arbitration, supra note 10, a t  129-30. By contrast, 
prior to 1940 grievance arbitration was rarely employed. Cohen & Eaby, supra at 18. 
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era1 sector grievance dispute infringes on a management right, 
the Executive Order comes into sharp conflict with the policy of 
encouraging collective bargaining and binding arbitration. 
When one of the parties to a grievance arbitration alleges 
that the arbitrator's decision has infringed on a management 
right or violated an applicable regulation, appeal can be made to 
the Federal Labor Relations C ~ u n c i l . ~ ~  The significance of the 
Council's decisons is apparent because it serves as the final appel- 
late tribunal for the majority of these appeals.27 In developing a 
standard that the Council can apply to balance management 
rights with the general policy favoring arbitration, it is useful to 
examine private sector appellate treatment of arbitral awards 
and the common arguments against and for binding public sector 
arbitration. 
II. APPLICABILITY OF PRIVATE SECTOR GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION 
PRACTICES TO THE FEDERAL SECTOR 
A. Appellate Treatment of Private Sector Arbitral Awards 
The judiciary had dignified the role of binding arbitration in 
the private sector by subjecting arbitral awards to very limited 
appellate review.28 Although a private sector arbitral award will 
be set aside if the arbitrator was biased or acted capricio~sly,~~ 
26. This interagency council is composed of the Secretary of Labor, the Chairman of 
the Civil Service Commission, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. 
To these regular members may be added other officials from the executiye branch as may 
be designated by the President. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 4(a), 3 C.F.R. 861,864 (1966- 
1970 Compilation) (as amended). 
27. There is considerable controversy over the appealability of federal sector arbitra- 
tion awards to the federal courts. This subject is beyond the scope of this comment. The 
principles, however, developed in this comment regarding the standard of review to be 
applied by the Federal Labor Relations Council could be adopted by the federal courts in 
the event that the courts are called on to review federal sector arbitration awards. For a 
brief discussion of the problem of appealability to the courts, see Kagel, supra note 5, a t  
145-46, and Seidenberg, supra note 2, at 235-36. 
When the appeal to the Council concerns the expenditures of government funds, the 
Comptroller General, the congressional watchdog, reserves the right to review the decision. 
Kagel, supra note 5, at 146-49. 
28. The leading cases are known as the "Steelworkers Trilogy": United Steelworkers 
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior & 
Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 
564 (1960). 
29. 9 U.S.C. 9 10(a)-(c) (1970); see Grodin, supra note 16, at 698-99; Comment, 
Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of Power and Final- 
i ty,  23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 936, 957 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Deference to 
Arbitration]. 
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awards are rarely overturned on other AS the test now 
stands, the factual findings of a private sector arbitrator will not 
be set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneou~,~' a 
procedural error will be disregarded unless it has prejudiced the 
outcome,32 and jurisdictional ambiguities will be resolved in favor 
of the arbitral process.33 Even legal issues that the parties have 
authorized for arbitral decision will not be disturbed.34 
B. Arguments Against Binding Public Sector Arbitration 
Notwithstanding the judicial deference toward binding arbi- 
tration in the private sector, there are at least three significant 
arguments for protecting certain management rights of federal 
agencies. First, there is a constitutional argument based on the 
closely related concepts of sovereigntyS5 and illegal delegation of 
powers.36 This constitutional argument asserts that the policy of 
30. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 36%. 593 (1960); 
United Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf Nav. Co. 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers 
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). For examples of exceptions to this general rule, 
see Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), and 
Coulson, Vaca v. Sipes' Illegitimate Child: The Impact of Anchor Motor Freight on the 
Finality Doctrine in Grievance Arbitration, 10 GA. L. REV. 693, 694 (1976). 
Recently, in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976), Justice 
Rehnquist argued that the Court had "cast aside the policy of finality of arbitration 
decisions and established a new policy of encouraging challenges to arbitration decrees." 
Id. a t  574 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Anchor Motor Freight can, however, be distin- 
guished on the ground that the arbitration panel was not in fact a neutral, impartial, third 
party panel. Rather, the arbitration panel was a bilateral committee organized on a 
geographical area basis and composed solely of an equal number of representatives of the 
union and management. See Coulson, supra, a t  697-98. The absence of a neutral third 
party raises a significant question about the adequacy of the representation, for the union 
may be induced to reach a settlement that protects its interests more adequately than the 
interests of the particular grieved employee. 
31. See Grodin, supra note 16, at 698-99. See also Federal Employees Metal Trades 
Council v. Mare Island Naval Shipyard, 1 F.L.R.C. 557 (1973). 
32. See Judicial Deference to Arbitration, supra note 29, a t  957. 
33. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); 
Judicial Deference to Arbitration, supra note 29, at 936-37. 
34. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960); 
Grodin, supra note 16, at 697; Judicial Deference to Arbitration, supra note 29, a t  960-61. 
Rulings in state courts support this same deference to arbitral awards. See id. at 950. 
35. See Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employ- 
ment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107,1108-11 (1969); Comment, Public Employee Labor organization, 
21 LOYOLA L. REV. 911, 912. The sovereignty doctrine is discussed in Railway Mail Ass'n 
v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 875, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607 (Sup. Ct. 1943), reu'd on other 
grounds sub nom. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 267 App. Div. 470, aff'd, 293 N.Y. 315, 56 
N.E.2d 721 (1944), aff'd, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). 
36. The illegal delegation of power doctrine can be thought of as closely related to 
the sovereignty doctrine; indeed, it has been called the offspring of the sovereignty doc- 
trine. Wellington & Winter, supra note 35, a t  1107. For a discussion of the illegal delega- 
tion of power doctrine, see id. at 1109-10. 
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deferring to arbitration in public sector employment encroaches 
on the sovereign prerogative by delegating important governmen- 
tal functions to nongovernmental officials. Because an arbitrator, 
unlike elected or appointed officials, is not answerable to the 
public, this argument also demonstrates the tension between ar- 
bitration and the fundamental democratic premise that govern- 
mental decisions are to be made by persons who are directly or 
a t  least indirectly responsible to the ele~torate.~' Although this 
constitutional argument has generally been rejected by state 
courts,38 it is unclear whether it will be accepted by the federal 
courts. The management rights sections of Executive Order 
11,491, however, clearly attempt to preserve the sovereignty of 
the federal government by expressly limiting the powers that can 
be delegated to an arbitrator. 
A related argument, also based on political considerations 
and referred to as "inordinate political leverage, " defends the 
democratic ethic that broad social issues should not be resolved 
until contrasting viewpoints are adequately represented, espe- 
cially when ethnic, racial, religious, or political heterogeneity 
exists? Partly because federal employees produce services that 
may be altered by an arbitral award and that may be socially or 
politically sensitive,40 grievance disputes over working conditions 
and other personnel matters in public employment can require an 
arbitrator to confront issues involving significant elements of so- 
cial planning? Even elected officials acting with the advice of 
legislatures, boards, and committees find it difficult to ade- 
quately assess the interests of the community a t  large. On the 
other hand, an arbitrator does not receive input from all interests 
that might be affected by a change in the quality or character of 
a governmental service. Realistically, an arbitrator only attempts 
to accommodate the disputants-the aggrieved employee, the 
union, and the management." Competing political interest of the 
public at large and of other interest groups are excluded.43 The 
arbitrator serves at the pleasure of the parties and interprets their 
agreement. Thus, undue emphasis on arbitral finality in public 
employment arguably might provide unions with inordinate le- 
37. Grodin, supra note 16, a t  680. 
38. See id. at 682-83. 
39. ~ e l l i n ~ t o n  & Winter, supra note 15, a t  816, 870. 
40. Id. a t  858. 
41. See Grodin, supra note 16, a t  682. 
42. See Wellington & Winter, supra note 15, a t  826-27. 
43. Grodin, supra note 16, at 681. 
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verage on governmental and social policy.44 
Economic distinctions between the private and public sec- 
tors provide the third major argument against adopting private 
sector deference when a public sector arbitral award interferes 
with a management right." In the private sector, individual eco- 
nomic interests of management, investors, and employees each 
compete with other such interests. The extent to which any group 
can prevail is limited by powerful market constraints that exert 
pressures on wages and Because of these external market 
constraints, private sector employers will vigorously resist griev- 
ance awards that may decrease the value of the product or service 
to the consuming public or that may increase costs or compensa- 
tion without correspondingly increasing productivity. Otherwise, 
the product or service will become less competitive and the em- 
ployer and investors will probably find it advantageous to invest 
their efforts or capital elsewhere." In public employment, how- 
ever, the economic interests of employees compete with societal 
interests. Furthermore, because there are few close substitutes for 
governmental services,48 the extent to which the employees' inter- 
ests can prevail is not limited by external market  constraint^.^^ 
Consequently, federal administrators arguably will find it easier 
to forego hard bargaining in favor of mutually acceptable compro- 
m i s e ~ . ~ ~  Moreover, if the public sector employers are less zealous 
in defending the agency position, the arbitrator will be less likely 
to scrutinize union demands and to evaluate carefully the public 
interests that might be affected. 
C.  Arguments For Binding Public Sector Arbitration 
However formidable these constitutional, political, and eco- 
nomic arguments are, they must be balanced against the vital 
public interest in securing and preserving peaceful labor- 
44. Wellington & Winter, supra note 15, a t  860. 
45. See Aronin, supra note 19, a t  577. 
46. Wellington & Winter, supra note 35, at 1119. 
47. Id. Moreover, the investor's choice to invest his capital elsewhere will not consti- 
tute an unfair labor practice in this circumstance. See Textile Workers Union v. Darington 
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). 
48. See Wellington & Winter, supra note 15, a t  846. In the private sector, where there 
are no close substitutes and the demand is inelastic, unions also accrue greater power to 
bargain for the benefits they desire without threat of layoffs and unemployment. Welling- 
ton & Winter, supra note 35, a t  1120. 
49. Wellington & Winter, supra note 35, a t  1120-21. 
50. Comment, The Civil Service-Collective Bargaining Conflict in the Public Sector: 
Attempts at Reconciliation, 38 U .  CHI. L. REV. 826, 835 (1971). 
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management relations. Federal employees have no legal right to 
strike. Their de facto right to strike, however, can be as effective, 
and thus as threatening, as the legalized right to strike of private 
sector employees. A "sick-out" by air traffic controllers or a slow- 
down by mail carriers can be as frustrating and as potentially 
damaging to commerce as a strike by employees of a private 
industry. In 1973 alone, federal, state, and local employees initi- 
ated 386 work stoppages and caused approximately two and one- 
half million work days idlea51 Moreover, unionization of federal 
employees has flourished during the past decade until today un- 
ions represent more than 60 percent of all nonpostal federal em- 
p l o y e e ~ . ~ ~  Thus, there is a real possibility of overt economic war- 
fare and considerable public inconvenience due to work stoppages 
in the federal sector. 
Binding arbitration, however, provides a fair and reasonably 
expedient alternative to overt economic warfare.53 Arbitration is 
more than a sophisticated strikebreaker who has exchanged his 
derby hat and brass knuckles of a half century ago for a pin- 
striped suit and an attache case." Experience with arbitration 
suggests that its availability as the final step for resolving dis- 
putes can influence public employees to refrain from using eco- 
nomic sanctions because the employees recognize that a strike 
will not be viewed sympathetically by the public if binding arbi- 
tration is available.55 
In addition to protecting the public interest in peaceful 
labor-management relations, binding arbitration also promotes 
the public interest in reducing litigation. Each overturned arbi- 
tral award invites other appeals, and the number of appeals from 
federal sector arbitration awards is already i n c r e a ~ i n g . ~ ~  If 
excepting to an award becomes the rule, a backlog will develop 
and justice will be administrated less effe~tively.~' 
51. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES-1975, a t  374 (1975). 
52. SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL SERVICE, HOUSE COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, 
FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS PROGRAM, 9 5 ~ ~  CONG., ST SESS. 2 
(Comm. Print 1977). Postal employees are organized independently. 5 U.S.C. $ 0  7101- 
7102 (1970). Certainly, it cannot be denied that federal employees possess significant 
economic muscle. 
53. See Grodin, supra note 16, a t  679-80; McAvoy, supra note 21, a t  1210-11; Kagel, 
supra note 5, at 149. But see Legality and Propriety of Arbitration, supra note 10, a t  142 
(no guarantee that arbitration will prevent strikes). 
54. See Meany, Common Sense in Labor Law, 27 LAB. L.J. 603, 604 (1976). 
55. Wellington & Winter, supra note 15, a t  832. 
56. Seidenberg, supra note 2, a t  233. 
57. Labor leaders already vigorously contend that employees suffer because manage- 
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Thus, when an arbitral award interferes with a management 
right, it  may be unwise to completely adopt the standards of 
arbitral finality that prevail in the private sector;" the scope of 
review of these awards, however, must be narrow.59 Conclusive- 
ness is a t  the heart of the arbitration processm because arbitration 
is only as fair and expedient as it is final? Without conclusive- 
ness, the grievance can continue indefinitely, the parties may 
seek other remedies, and the number of appeals will swell. There- 
fore, a standard of review must be developed to protect essential 
management rights while preserving peaceful labor-management 
relations and discouraging unmeritorious appeals. The standard 
must be fair. Moreover, it must be easy to apply in order to assure 
that grievance resolution will be reasonably expedient. 
Presently, the Federal Labor Relations Council grants con- 
siderable deference to arbitration awards. Like the courts in the 
private sector, the Council will reverse an award if the arbitrator 
was biased or capricious of if the fact findings are clearly erro- 
neous." With respect to those awards that allegedly interfere with 
ment can commit unfair labor practices and yet delay justice for years. See, e.g., Meany, 
supra note 54, at 603, 606. A backlog of exceptions to arbitral awards in the federal sector 
would add to the already significant problem of delay that results from the inability of a 
party to force a recalcitrant party to comply with the arbitrator's award. Presently, there 
is no summary and sure method to secure compliance. Unless the recalcitrant party 
obtains a stay pending appeal, failure to comply with the award may be an unfair labor 
practice, even if the award is subsequently declared to be invalid. In the federal employ- 
ment system, however, the unfair-labor-practice method of settling disputes is time con- 
suming. The method consists of "informal procedures, formal Regional Administrators' 
actions, hearings before hearing officers, and appeals to the Assistant Secretary of Labor 
for Labor-Management Relations, who can, if the question is one of 'major policy,' refer 
it to the Federal Labor Relations Council." Kagel, supra note 5, at 143. See 29 C.F.R. 9 
203.1- .27 (1976). 
58. Cf. R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, & T. ST. M I N E ,  supra note 22, at 752-53 (quoting 
Great Lakes Assembly, Report on Collective Bargaining in State and Local Government) 
(public sector employment should not "slavishly follow" precedents from the private 
sector); Wellington & Winter, supra note 35, at 1111 (complete adoption of private sector 
practices is inappropriate). 
59. After reviewing the experience with arbitration under Exec. Order 10,988, the 
Study Committee recommended that advisory arbitration should be discontinued and 
that "arbitrators decisions should be accepted by the parties." Exceptions to arbitral 
awards "should be sustained only on grounds similar to those applied by the courts in 
private sector labor-management relations," and the exceptions should be handled 
"expeditously." See U.S. FEDERAL ABOR RELATIONS Cowca, supra note 10, a t  74 (empha- 
sis added). These recommendations were incorporated into Exec. Order 11,491. 
60. Judicial Deference to Arbitration, supra note 29, at 949, 961-62. 
61. See Coulson, supra note 30, at 693-94. 
62. See 5 C.F.R. 8 2411.37(a) (1977). 
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mandatory or discretionary management rights, however, the 
Council has not enunciated a clear or consistent standard. The 
Council has simply stated that it will reverse an award that vio- 
lates a law, the Executive Order, or an appropriate agency policy 
or regula t i~n .~~ 
For example, in Francis E. Warren Air Force Base u. Ameri- 
can Federation of Government Employees, Local 2354," the 
Council reviewed an agency's appeal from an arbitral award in 
which the arbitrator determined that the grievant employee had 
been wrongfully denied a promotion. The employee had been 
previously demoted from a higher grade, but not for personal 
cause. By the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the 
employee was entitled to special consideration for future employ- 
ment vacancies at the grade he previously occupied. When a va- 
cancy occurred, the employee was passed over and consequently 
a grievance was filed. The arbitrator determined that the terms 
of the collective bargaining agreement governed the situation, 
that the employee had been wronged, and that the position 
should now be made available to him. Although the Council's 
opinion does not expressly refer to interference with the manage- 
ment rights set forth in the order, the arbitrator's award did 
restrict section 12(b) rights, including the right to "promote, 
transfer, assign, and retain  employee^."^^ The Council found that 
the award interfered specifically with two Civil Service Commis- 
sion  regulation^,^^ and therefore concluded that the award should 
be set aside. 
This ease typifies the Council's decisions that have reviewed 
arbitration awards and illustrates the approach that the Council 
has employed in those reviews. If the award does interfere with a 
management right by conflicting with the order itself or with a 
published policy or regulation issued by either an agency head- 
quarters or a primary national subdivision of an agency, then the 
Council will reverse the award. If the award does not interfere, the 
Council will sustain the award!' 
This approach is inadequate to fully achieve the purposes of 
arbitration in the federal sector. The approach fails to adequately 
63. Id. 8 2411.32. 
64. 4 F.L.R.C. No. 75A-127 (Sept. 30, 1976) (Rep. No. 114). 
65. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 12(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. 861,869 (1966-1970 Compilation) (as 
amended). 
66. 4 F.L.R.C. No. 75A-127, at 6. 
67. Defense Commercial Communications Office v. National Ass'n of Gov't Employ- 
ees, Local Union No R7-23, 5 F.L.R.C. No. 75A-87 (Jan. 19, 1977) (Rep. No. 121). 
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restrain an agency's tendency to protect as much of its own dis- 
cretion as possible by issuing policies and regulations covering 
virtually every aspect of management. Moreover, the approach 
focuses simply on whether the award conflicts with a published 
policy or regulation and fails to evaluate the justification for the 
policy or regulation. Finally, this approach subjects agency poli- 
cies and regulations to less scrutiny when they are examined be- 
cause of an alleged conflict with an arbitral award than when they 
are examined in the context of union-management contract nego- 
tiations. 
In the process of negotiating a collective bargaining agree- 
ment, an agency administrator may determine that an issue is 
nonnegotiable and the agency may refuse to bargain with the 
union about that issue. To test the negotiability of the issue, the 
union may appeal to the Federal Labor Relations C o u n ~ i l . ~ ~  In 
this circumstance, as with appeals from arbitration awards, the 
Council has stated that it will sustain the position of the federal 
agency if the union proposal violates the law, the executive order, 
or an appropriate agency policy or regulation." But with regard 
to negotiability disputes, the Council has additionally enunciated 
an appellate standard by which it will test the union proposal 
that allegedly interferes with an agency policy or regulation. 
Applying this standard, the Council will sustain the agency's 
refusal to negotiate based on the alleged conflict only if the appl- 
icable policy or regulation is issued from a federal agency head- 
quarters or a primary national agency subdivision and is sup- 
ported by a "compelling need."'O The Council has explained that 
a policy or regulation is supported by a compelling need if it 
meets one or more of the following five illustrative criteria: 
[I] The policy or regulation is essential, as distinguished 
from helpful or desirable, to the accomplishment [of the] mis- 
sion of the agency or the primary national subdivision; 
[2] The policy or regulation is essential, as distinguished 
from helpful or desirable, to the management of the agency or 
the primary national subdivision; 
68. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 4 ll(c),  3 C.F.R. 861, 869 (1966-1970 Compilation) (as 
amended). 
69. Id. 4 ll(c)(4). 
70. Id. 4 ll(a), 3 C.F.R. at 868; see, e.g., National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Local 
No. R14-87 v. Kansas Nat'l Guard, 5 F.L.R.C. Nos. 76A-16, -17, -40, -43, -54 (Jan. 19, 
1977) (Rep. No. 120) (National Guard Bureau regulations not supported by a "compelling 
need"). 
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[3] The policy or regulation is necessary to insure the 
maintenance of basic merit principles; 
[4] The policy or regulation implements a mandate to 
the agency or primary national subdivision under law or other 
outside authority, which implementation is essentially nondis- 
cretionary in nature; or 
[5] The policy or regulation establishes uniformity for all 
or a substantial segment of the employees of the agency or pri- 
mary national subdivision where this is essential to the effectua- 
tion of the public interest." 
The thesis of this comment is that the Council could and 
should also apply this compelling need standard when it reviews 
an arbitral award that is challenged because it allegedly conflicts 
with an agency policy or regulation. This test provides a multifac- 
eted approach that can be applied to most union proposals which 
might interfere with management rights. Moreover, because the 
Council defines the criteria as illustrative, the test can 
be expanded to fit unforeseen situations. According to this stan- 
dard, the Council would sustain the award unless the Council 
found that the applicable policy or regulation was supported by 
a compelling need. 
The Council's analysis could proceed as follows. First, the 
Council would consider whether the arbitrator's award actually 
conflicts with an agency policy or regulation that protects a man- 
datory or discretionary management right. If it did not conflict, 
the award would be sustained. Similarly, if the interference were 
merely de minimus, the award would be sustained. If, however, 
the award did conflict with the policy or regulation, then the 
Council would proceed to categorize the interference according 
to the interest or interests protected by the policy or regulation. 
The illustrative criteria identify five such interests: (1) accom- 
plishment of the agency mission, (2) management of the agency, 
(3) maintenance of basic merit principles, (4) implementation of 
nondiscretionary mandates, and (5) uniform treatment of em- 
ployees where such uniformity is in the public interest. After 
categorizing the interest affected, the Council would apply the 
relevant test or tests specified in the criteria. Generally, in order 
to apply the relevant test, the Council will be required to define 
the parameters of the specific interest with which the award in- 
terferes. For example, the test for the first category will require 
71. 5 C.F.R. 6 2413.2 (1977) (emphasis added). 
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the Council to define the "agency mission;" for the third cate- 
gory, "basic" merit principles; for the fourth category, the con- 
gressional, executive, or judicial "mandate;" for the fifth cate- 
gory, the "public interest" in uniform personnel policies.72 From 
the illustrative criteria it is clear that a need is not compelling 
unless it is essential or nondiscretionary. Thus, this final inquiry 
should include an evaluation of whether there are less restrictive 
alternatives that still protect the essential management right but 
diminish the restrictive impact on the arbitrator's discretion in 
fashioning a remedy. 
Implementing the compelling need standard for reviewing 
arbitration awards would bring numerous benefits to federal sec- 
tor labor-management relations. First, the compelling need stan- 
dard introduces greater certainty regarding the outcome of an 
appeal from an arbitrator's award. In so doing, the compelling 
need standard may adequately respond to the constitutional 
challenge to the use of binding arbitration in the federal sector. 
Most state courts considering the propriety of arbitration in pub- 
lic employment have held that the problems of sovereignty and 
illegal delegation of powers are satisfied if the arbitrator is di- 
rected to exercise his power in accordance with unambiguous 
decisional standards supplied by the proper governmental au- 
t h ~ r i t y . ~ ~  Executive Order 11,491 as amended contains some deci- 
sional standards for the a r b i t r a t ~ r . ~ ~  Standing alone these deci- 
sional standards are rather ambiguous; however, the compelling 
need standard adds greater certainty to the review process. For 
this reason, the compelling need standard should also promote 
more serious negotiations by the parties before they refer the 
matter to the arbitrator. 
Second, although the compelling need standard may not 
completely satisfy the inordinate-political-leverage challenge by 
72. The second category, unlike the others, covers a nonspecific interest-manage- 
ment-the parameters of which are difficult to define. Because it too is subject to the 
final requirement of the test-that the particular policy or regulation be supported by a 
compelling need, the category should not become a loophole through which agency offi- 
cials can subvert the arbitration process. 
73. Staudohar, Constitutionality of Compulsory Arbitration Statutes in Public Em- 
ployment, 27 LAB. L.J. 670, 675-76 (1976); McAvoy, supra note 21, at 1205-06; Wellington 
& Winter, supra note 15, at 835. 
74. The order provides that the administration of the collective bargaining agreement 
is subject to "existing or future laws and the regulations of appropriate authorities, includ- 
ing policies set forth in the Federal Personnel Manual," to "published agency policies and 
regulations in existence at the time the agreement was approved," and to "subsequently 
published agency policies and regulations." Exec. Order 11,491, 8 12(a), 3 C.F.R. 861,869 
(1966-1970 Compilation) (as amended). 
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involving all interested parties, the standard does substantially 
decrease the likelihood that an arbitrator will intrude into areas 
where there are significant policy questions. Overcoming this ar- 
gument by involving all interested parties in the dispute resolu- 
tion process would be extremely difficult. The need for an expedi- 
tious resolution virtually precludes the possibility that all interest 
groups can be effectively represented. The compelling need stan- 
dard, however, will force the arbitrator to focus on the agency's 
mission, and that mission will generally be defined in terms of the 
public interest, at least the public interest as it is perceived by 
the President and Congress. Thus, although all interest groups 
cannot be represented, the public interest in general is not neg- 
lected.15 
Third, the compelling need standard also provides at least 
one method for dealing with the economic argument against 
adopting private sector deference to arbitration. The compelling 
need standard cannot supply competition; nor can it provide tra- 
ditional external market constraints. But the need to remain 
within overall agency budget limitations as well as the need to 
adequately fund alternative agency programs could serve as com- 
pelling needs.'This will be particularly true when the President 
and Congress require that federal agencies employ tighter fiscal 
accountability and justify increased expenditures by cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Fourth, the compelling need standard is already familiar to 
union representatives and management officials who are partici- 
pating in federal sector collective bargaining. Recently, because 
the compelling need test had been applied to negotiability dis- 
putes, several federal agencies have begun to systematically re- 
view their regulations and to identify those regulations that the 
agency considered to be justified by a compelling need." 
Fifth, the compelling need standard permits the Federal 
Labor Relations Council to delineate federal standards through 
a case-by-case approach. The Council has expressed a desire to 
75. Experience suggests, moreover, that despite the pressure from the bargaining 
parties, arbitrators are not likely to subordinate public interests, especially if the decison 
might create disruptive political or social reactions. See Legality and Propriety of Arbitra- 
tion, supra note 10, at 141. 
76. It has been suggested that the decisional standards which the federal sector 
arbitrator must employ should be amended to require the arbitrator to specifically con- 
sider the agency budget constraints. See Grodin, supra note 16, at 684-85 & 687 n.31. 
77. Telephone conversation with Maj. Dennis Coupe, Instructor in Labor Law at the 
Judge Advocate General's School in Charlottesville, Virginia (March 10, 1977). 
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use case-by-case, individualized analysis so that it can proceed 
carefully as it makes new law in the federal sector.78 
Sixth, the compelling need standard is flexible enough to 
accommodate changing circumstances. National priorities 
change in response to international and domestic development, 
including changes in the administration. The executive branch 
must maintain the ability to respond. The compelling need stan- 
dard permits management rights to expand or contract in accord- 
ance with national priorities and redefinitions of agency missions. 
From the unions' perspective, this flexibility introduces a dis- 
quieting ambiguity into the review process. The flexibility, how- 
ever, is in the public interest and is not unpredictably extensive. 
Finally, and perhaps the most importantly, employing the 
compelling need standard for reviewing appeals from arbitration 
awards would adequately implement the intent of Executive 
Order 11,491. The order is intended to make the scope of review 
narrow enough to protect the public interest by promoting collec- 
tive bargaining and arbitration and by discouraging unmerito- 
rious appeals, but broad enough to account for the exigencies of 
public employment. Moreover, the order expressly requires man- 
agement to retain only those rights that accord with applicable 
policies and regulations.'' When tested on appeal in negotiability 
disputes, it is clear that "applicable policies and regulations" are 
only those which are supported by a compelling need.80 Only these 
policies and regulations define the scope of collective bargaining; 
only the same policies and regulations should define the scope of 
an arbitrator's discretion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As has been noted, 
A government which imposes upon other employers certain obli- 
gations in dealing with their employees may not in good faith 
refuse to deal with its own public servants on a reasonably simi- 
lar favorable basis, modified, of course, to meet the exigencies 
of the public service.81 
78. U.S. FEDERAL LABOR ELATIONS COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 38 (1975 Council rec- 
ommendations). 
79. The mandatory management rights section is prefaced with these words: 
"management officials of the agency retain [these rights] in accordance with applicable 
laws and regulations," Exec. Order No. 11,491, fi 12(b), 3 C.F.R. 861, 869 (1966-1970 
Compilation) (as amended). 
80. See note 73-75 and accompanying text supra. 
81. ABA SECTION OF LABOR ELATIONS LAW, REPORT OF C O M M ~ E  ON LABOR ELA- 
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By accounting for the exigencies of the public service, the compel- 
ling need standard provides the Federal Labor Relations Council, 
federal agencies, and unions with an appropriate standard for 
reviewing arbitral awards. Its application in arbitration appeals 
would end the present dissimilar treatment for negotiability dis- 
putes and grievance disputes." Moreover, the compelling need 
standard is reasonably similar to the standard employed in the 
private sector. 
Undoubtedly, collective bargaining in federal sector labor- 
management relations is here to stay," and binding third party 
arbitration will continue to play a vital role in federal sector 
grievance dispute resolution. The compelling need standard rec- 
ommends itself as a standard that can help federal sector collec- 
tive bargaining to work more effectively by protecting essential 
governmental interests while accommodating significant em- 
ployee rights. 
TIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES 89,90 (1955), reprinted in part in R. SMITH, L. MERRI- 
FIELD, & T. ST. ANTOINE, supra note 22, at 711 (emphasis added). 
82. Parties to a grievance dispute cannot circumvent an unsupported regulation, 
whereas a regulation in a negotiability contest can be challenged. A modification to the 
present appealability standards may be necessary to enable a disputant to raise the 
compelling need issue before the Council in an arbitration dispute. Currently, appellate 
review may be obtained only if grounds are shown that the "award violates applicable law, 
appropriate regulation, or the order or other grounds similar to those upon which chal- 
lenges to arbitration awards are sustained by courts in private sector labor-management 
relations." 5 C.F.R. 4 2411.32 (1977). If, for example, an arbitrator denies a grievance 
because of a regulation, then the decision does not "violate" the regulation and it cannot 
be appealed. The regulation, however, should nevertheless be challengable if not sup- 
ported by a compelling need. 
83. Aaron, Reflections on Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 27 LAB. L.J. 453, 458 
(1976). 
